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INCOME TAX-THREE-PARTY SALE-LEASEBAcKs-True Leases or 
Financing Techniques? Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 
561 (1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A sale-leaseback, in its simplest form, involves an owner of 
property! selling that property outright and simultaneously leasing 
it back from the purchaser,2 frequently with renewal or repurchase 
provisions. 3 The term, however, has become a catch-all description 
for numerous transactions entered into for various reasons. Many of 
these transactions are far more complex than the simple two-party 
sale-leaseback. 4 In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 5 the com­
plexities included the involvement of three parties and the in­
tertwining of numerous terms and conditions. 6 When the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari,7 it appeared ready to an­
1. Sale-leasebacks are most commonly used with real property involving large 
amounts of money. Historically, however, the transaction developed as a method for 
acquiring industrial equipment. See Olsen & Wisniewski, Leasing: The Current Tax 
Picture in Rental of Industrial Facilities and Equipment, 29 J. TAX. 12 (1968); 
Robertson, Leasing Arrangements from the Investor's Viewpoint, 46 TAXES 787 
(1968); Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 21 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 
621 (1969). 
2. The purchaser-lessor can be a single investor or a syndicate of investors. 
These realty syndicates may take the form of corporations, unincorporated associa­
tions, limited partnerships, or trusts. See Rabinowitz, Realty Syndication: An Income 
Tax Primer for Investor and Promoter, 29 J. TAX. 92 (1968); Robertson, supra note 1. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, has affected 
these shelters. Besides limiting the availability of tax shelter techniques, the Act has 
affected depreciation deductions through recapture provisions and interest deduc­
tions by restricting the deductability of prepaid interest. For a complete analysis of 
the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 on real estate tax shelters, see Dailey & 
Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate Tax Shelter: The Tax Reform Scalpel, 55 TAXES 
127 (1977). For simplicity, this article will limit its analysis to the single investor. 
3. See generally Cary, Corporate Financing through the Sale-Leaseback of 
Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1948); Wil­
son, Sales and Leasebacks, 16 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 149 (1964). 
4. See Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transaction of Real Property-A Proposal, 30 
TAX LAW. 701 (1977). 
5. \ 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
6. See notes 10-16 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an 
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nounce comprehensive, workable guidelines to facilitate tax plan­
ning for sale-Ieasebacks. Instead, the Court has handed down a 
multi-faceted opinion upholding the particular sale-leaseback in 
question, but rendering the future treatment of these transactions 
unpredictable. 
The following discussion describes the relative position of the 
Lyon transaction in the broad spectrum of sale-Ieasebacks. It exam­
ines the conceptual difficulties which have hindered earlier attempts 
to establish guidelines for the tax treatment of sale-lease backs, 
questions the Supreme Court's analysis of the transaction, and 
suggests future effects of Lyon on these transactions. 
II. THE LYON CASE 
In April 1965, the Worthen Bank and Trust Company 
(Worthen) planned construction of a multi-story banking and office 
facility to serve as its headquarters. Various state and federal regu­
lations prohibited conventional financing. s Worthen therefore en­
tered into a sale-leaseback arrangement with the Frank Lyon Com­
pany (Lyon),9 the taxpayer, who took title to the facility and leased 
indicated conflict with American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th 
Cir. 1974). This case involved a sale-leaseback transaction similar to the Lyon trans­
action except that the building in question was a complete income-producing prop­
erty at the time the parties entered into the transaction. Unlike the Eighth Circuit in 
the Lyon case, however, the Court allowed the lessor to take the desired depreciation 
deductions on the facility. 
From this stated purpose of the Court, one could be assured that the conflict 
would be resolved through the establishment of uniform guidelines or at least an 
uniform analysis. Failure of the Court in this respect has left open the possibility of 
similar conflicts in the future. Businessmen and tax planners alike face the possibil­
ity of their transactions being struck down by a lower court after the transactions 
have taken effect. 
8. 435 U.S. at 563-64. Worthen originally desired to finance, build, and itself 
own the proposed facility by selling debentures and acquiring the capital stock of a 
wholly owned subsidiary which, upon receipt of the title to the facility, would raise 
the remaining funds by a conventional mortgage. Arkansas banking laws imposed a 
ceiling on interest-payable debentures rendering the debentures unattractive in the 
then existing financial market. Additionally, since the proposed investment in the 
banking facility was in excess of 40% of Worthen's capital stock and surplus, the 
Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System refused to ratify 
the plan as required by 12 U.S.C. § 371d (1976), Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 
265.2(f)(7) (1978), and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977). 
9. Worthen negotiated with several interested investors, including Lyon. Lyon 
was a closely held corporation engaged in the distribution of electrical products. 
Worthen selected Lyon as the investor because of its acceptance of Worthen's coun­
terproposal which incorporated the best features of the proposed offers. 435 U.S. at 
565. 
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it back to the bank for its long term use. to As the investor, Lyon 
Frank Lyon, chairman of the board of the taxpayer company, served on Worth­
en's board and had substantial business relations with Worthen. Normally, such a 
relationship would indicate a sham transaction. However, the Court's doubts as to 
the parties' intent to deal at arm's length were discharged by the uniqueness of the 
transaction to Worthen, and the fact that Worthen opened the negotiations to any 
interested investor. See id. at 581-82. 
10. The transfer of title and leaseback involved a ground lease, a sales agree­
ment, and a building lease. Worthen as the owner of the site, leased the site to Lyon 
for a period of 76 years and 7 months. The first 19 months equaled the estimated 
construction period of the facility. The first 26 years and 7 months, excluding the 
construction period, constituted the period of the mortgage. During that period the 
rents amounted to only $50 per year. The parties favored the minimal ground rents, 
since increased ground rents would require an equal increase in building rents paid 
by Worthen, resulting in a wash item. Beyond the initial rental period, however, the 
rents sharply increased, ranging from $100,000 to $250,000 per year over the next 50 
years. ld. at 565. 
Under the sales agreement, Worthen agreed to sell the building to Lyon piece 
by piece as it was constructed for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000. This proce­
dure allowed both parties to retain a substantial sales tax saving since by Arkansas 
law, purchases of material by a national bank were exempt from the state sales tax. 
Also, the piecemeal sales of the building constituted sales of real estate and were 
exempt from the sales tax. See id. at 566 n.2. Since the piecemeal sale of the build­
ing has no effect on the federal tax treatment of the parties, this article treats the 
transaction as requiring the sale of the completed facility. 
The building lease constituted a net lease which, by definition, imposes upon 
Worthen as a lessee the responsibilities for all the expenses, risks, and liabilities 
associated with the facility, excluding wear and tear. [d. at 567. A summary of the 
lease terms may be found in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749-50 
(8th Cir. 1976). Worthen also had an option to repurchase at various times at stated 
prices or to renew the lease up to eight additional terms at five-year intervals. 435 
U.S. at 566-67. 
The combination of the ground lease and the building lease created a time gap 
during which Lyon would be without Worthen as a tenant, but would still be leasing 
the site of the facility from Worthen under the terms of the ground lease. This "shirt 
tail" period could, depending upon Worthen's exercise of its five-year renewal op­
tions, extend from a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 50 years. [75-year ground 
lease-{25-year primary ternl of lease + total renewal period opted by Worthen) = 
the "shirt tail" period]. During this period, Lyon still had to satisfy the rental obliga­
tions to Worthen on the ground lease. Lyon could offset the ground rent only by 
acquiring a lessee willing to pay sufficient rents to defray ownership expenses as 
well as ground rent. Thus, if Worthen refused to renew or purchase and Lyon failed 
to secure another lessee, Lyon would bear the risk of being left with an empty, 
non-income-producing facility. 
The agreements left unclear who owned the facility upon the expiration of the 
ground lease. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the retention of 
the land reserved to Worthen "substantial control over the ultimate disposition of the 
building should the bank forgo its option privileges." See 536 F.2d at 752-53 n.6. If 
Lyon retained control at the end of the ground lease period, it would have to either 
sell the building to Worthen, renegotiate a building lease with Worthen, purchase 
the site, or renegotiate the ground lease. Otherwise, Lyon would not be able to use 
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supplied an out-of-pocket at-risk investment of $500,000. 11 This in­
vestment could return up to 6% per year, depending upon Worth­
en's exercise of the lease renewal and repurchase options. 12 
Worthen obtained for Lyon interim construction financing from the 
First National City Bank of New York (Citibank).13 After approving 
Lyon as the investor, New York Life Insurance Company (New 
York Life) provided permanent long-term financing for the proj­
ect.14 Upon completion of the facility, Lyon used the New York 
Life funds to discharge the interim construction loan from Citibank, 
thus eliminating Citibank from the transaction. 15 
The series of complementary and interlocking agreements 
among the parties obligated Worthen to pay rent equal to the prin­
cipal and interest payments of Lyon's mortgage. Worthen also pos­
sessed an option to repurchase the facility at stipulated times with 
stated prices equal to the then unpaid balance of Lyon's mort­
gage plus the initial $500,000 equity with 6% return. 16 In 19~9, the 
the building without trespassing on Worthen's property. The Supreme Court, how­
ever, failed to comment on the issue, concentrating on the aspects of the transaction 
within the ground lease period. 
11. The total purchase price of the facility amounted to $7,640,000. Since New 
York Life Insurance Company had agreed to permanent financing of $7,140,000, 
Lyon was required by the terms of the agreement to supply the difference of 
$500,000 as equity. During negotiations, Worthen had proposed that the investor 
selected for the transaction supply the equity. See note 9 supra and accompanying 
text. Lyon agreed to the counterproposal and supplied the necessary funds required 
by Worthen to complete the financing of the new building. See also Rosenburg & 
Weinstein, Sales-Leasebacks: An Analysis of these Transactions after the Lyon Deci­
sion, 45 J. TAX. 146 (1976). 
12. Over the primary 25-year term, Worthen had the option to buy the facility 
at specific times and prices. In addition to including the unpaid balance of the un­
derlying building mortgage, each repurchase figure included the $500,000 personal 
investment plus 6% return. 435 U.S. at 567. 
13. [d. 
14. New York Life agreed to purchase Lyon's $7,140,0006%% 25-year secured 
note which was issued upon completion of the building. The mortgage was secured 
by a first deed of trust executed by the taxpayer and Worthen, which conveyed to 
New York Life title to the land and facility. As additional security, Lyon assigned its 
interest in the building lease and ground lease to New York Life. In a separate 
agreement with New York Life, Worthen consented to the assignment and agreed not 
to terminate the lease during the 25-year period of the mortgage. 435 U.S. at 567-68. 
See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1976). 
15. 435 U.S. at 568. 
16. Total rent for the building over the primary term of the lease was 
$14,989,767.24, which equaled the principal and interest that would amortize the 
$7,140,000 mortgage loan to Lyon for the same period. The lease terms included 
options to repurchase the building at the end of 11, 15, 20, and 25 years at prices 
equal to Lyon's investment of $500,000 at 6% return plus the sum of the unpaid 
balance of the New York Life mortgage. [d. at 566-67. 
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year the building was completed, rent began to accrue to Lyon 
from Worthen. While Lyon included the rent as income,17 it also 
claimed deductions for depreciation18 on the Worthen building, for 
interest paid on the interim and permanent mortgage loans,19 and 
for other expenses incurred in the construction of the building. 20 
The full tax benefits of ownership therefore accrued to Lyon as a 
result of a relatively small out-of-pocket investment. 
On audit of Lyon's 1969 return,21 the Commissioner of Inter­
nal Revenue disallowed the deductions, asserting that as a matter 
of economic substance for federal tax purposes, Worthen retained 
the real ownership in the building. 22 The Commissioner assessed a 
deficiency on Lyon's federal income tax,23 which Lyon paid. Upon 
denial of its claim for a refund, Lyon initiated suit in federal dis-
At the end of the primary term, if Worthen desired to renew the lease, the rents 
were reduced by approximately 50% to $300,000 per year. These rents were propor­
tionately washed by the ground rents due from Lyon. Lyon's recoupment of its in­
vestment, however, rested on its ability to rent the facility for the "shirt tail" period. 
See note 10 supra and accompanying text. If Lyon failed to realize sufficient rental 
during the period, the investment return would fall proportionately. See Zarrow & 
Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria, 
49 J. TAX. 42 (1978). 
17. I.R.C. § 61. 
18. Id. § 167. 
19. Id. § 163. 
20. 435 U.S. at 568. 
21. Worthen moved into the facility on December 1, 1969. 
22. The gist of the Commissioner's argument was that the sale-leaseback in 
question constituted a financing transaction in which Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000 
and acted as a conduit for the transmission of principal and interest from Worthen to 
New York Life. Id. at 569. 
23. If the transaction constituted a financing technique which lacked substance, 
the rent would not be included in Lyon's gross income, nor would the deductions 
related to the facility be allowed. On Lyon's return, however, because the deduc­
tions exceeded Lyon's rental income reported, the Service increased Lyon's reported 
income by $497,219.18. This created a tax deficiency of $236,596.36 which together 
with interest of $43,790.84 resulted in an assessment of $280,387.20 for the year of 
1969. Id. 
Most of this assessment resulted from expenses accrued during the construction 
of the facility, amounting to $451,666.75. The deductions which are important here 
are the depreciation deduction of $51,618.79 and the interest deduction from the 
mortgage of $40,162.50 taken by Lyon for December 1969. These deductions surpass­
ed the rental income for the same period of $48,527.01, thus creating a tax loss. If the 
Commissioner had allowed the deductions, Lyon would have received favorable tax 
treatment. The deductions would have offset reported income unrelated to the sale­
leaseback transaction to the extent of the tax loss. For an analysis of the tax savings, 
see Gallagher, Tax Consequences of a Leveraged Lease Transaction, 52 TAXES 356 
(1974); Robertson, supra note 1. But see 435 U.S. at 580 n.15. 
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trict court.24 In a memorandum opinion the court ruled that the 
claimed deductions were allowable. 25 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit reversed,26 holding that the burdens, benefits, and 
risks which Lyon had incurred were too insubstantial to establish 
ownership status for tax purposes. 27 After granting certiorari,28 the 
Supreme Court reversed,29 holding that Lyon retained significant 
and genuine attributes of a lessor which gave Lyon a depreciable 
interest in the facility. 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Because the repurchase options and lease renewals permitted 
Lyon to recover its $500,000 investment with up to 6% return, the 
Service argued that the transaction represented a financing scheme 
without sufficient economic substance to constitute a depreciable 
interest in the facility. The Service claimed as controlling prece­
dent an earlier Supreme Court case, Helvering v. F & R Lazarus 
and CO.30 In Lazarus the taxpayer had transferred properties to a 
24. Suit arose in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas. 
25. The court concluded that the intention of the parties as evidenced by their 
written agreements, read in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances at 
the time of the agreement, was to create a sale-leaseback with the option to repur­
chase. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 75-2 US TC (CCH) ~ 9545 (1975); Frank Lyon 
Co. v. United States, 36 FED. TAXES 2d (P-H) ~ 5059 (E.D. Ark. 1975). See also 435 
U.S. at 569. 
26. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976). 
27. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit based its inquiry on whether 
the final business bargain allowed Lyon, as a lessor, to retain sufficient interests in 
the property consistent with a lessor-lessee relationship. This was not determined by 
the intent of the parties, but rather by the allocation of the interests between the 
parties as defined by the written documents. After examining the various interests 
allocated by the documents, the court concluded that the features of the lease 
cumulatively deprived Lyon of a depreciable interest. For the purpose of taxation, 
Lyon's ownership interest in the facility was too insignificant to allow him the bene­
fits of depreciation deductions. See also notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text. 
28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
29. See notes 30-47 infra and accompanying text. 
30. 308 U.S. 252 (1939). 
In Lazarus, the taxpayer transferred properties to a trust, and then leased them 
from the trust for 99 years with repurchase options at stated scheduled prices. The 
taxpayer as lessee sought the depreciation deductions by arguing that the transaction 
was in reality.a mortgage to secure a loan and, therefore, retained the right to take 
the deductions. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the grounds that 
the right to take depreciation followed legal title. Completely disregarding the lessor 
as the owner, the Court permitted the deductions by treating the transaction as a 
financing transaction. 
The taxpayer-lessor in Lyon, however, had title to the depreciable facility and 
argued that it possessed sufficient incidents of ownership in the building to render 
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trust and released them, a situation unlike the Lyon sale-leaseback 
which involved an independent third party, the mortgagee. 31 The 
Court held that this distinction, as well as the unavailability of the 
simpler two-party arrangement by virtue of the state and federal 
banking restrictions,32 removes Lyon from the controlling authority 
of Lazarus. 33 Lazarus would apply only if Worthen had been able 
to directly secure the mortgage agreement with New York Life and 
to receive the $500,000 loan from Lyon. 34 
The majority's inquiry into the Worthen-Lyon transaction 
focused on whether the substance35 of the entire transaction 
amounted to an "elaborate financing scheme" or a bona-fide trans­
fer of title sufficient to give the taxpayer-lessor a depreciable inter­
est in the building. 36 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
after stressing that "no simple device [was] available to peel away 
the form of this transaction and to reveal its substance,"37 em­
phasized that the agreements in their final forms imposed primary 
liability on Lyon.3s Various contingencies surrounding Worthen's 
him the owner for tax purposes. The Commissioner, contrasting his position in 
Lazarus, claimed that the transactions were only a financing technique with Lyon 
being a mere conduit to forward mortgage payments to the mortgagee, New York 
Life. See 435 U.S. at 574-75. 
31. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
32. 435 U.S. at 575. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
33. It should be noted that Lazarus still stands as controlling precedent in sim­
pler two-party transactions. The transaction need only possess the necessary eco­
nomic substance to render the lessor the owner for tax purposes. 
34. 435 U.S. at 575-76. 
35. The Court's analysis rests on the established principle that the "objective 
economic realities" of a transaction rather than its particular form govern for tax pur­
poses. The Court noted, " 'In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the 
courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are 
not rigidly binding.' " ld. at 573 (quoting Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 
U.S. 252, 255 (1939)). If a genuine multiparty transaction exists, the fact that it consti­
tutes a sale-leaseback will not operate in itself to deny proper tax benefits for the 
taxpayer. S'ee id. at 584 n.19. 
36. ld. at 573. 
37. ld. at 576. 
38. Id. at 576-77. Justice Blackmun explained that the effect of this liability on 
Lyon was not just the abstract possibility of an extraordinary circumstance occurring 
as to prevent Worthen from making its rental payments. The realities of the situation 
placed the liability on Lyon's shoulders "for all the world to see," while Lyon as a 
continual enterprise "exposed its very business well-being to this real and substan­
tial risk." I d. at 577. 
Lyon did not exist as a corporation established by Worthen or even financed to 
any degree by Worthen, but prevailed as an independently owned business entity 
interested in investment of its funds. The transaction thus appeared to be conducted 
at arm's length. See note 9 supra and accompanying test. 
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exercise of its options to repurchase or renew made Lyon's recov­
ery of its investment with a guaranteed return highly improbable. 39 
Additionally, state and federal banking statutes had barred 
Worthen from entering into the specific two-party financing agree­
ment which the Service urged to be the true substance of the 
transaction. 4o To the Court, these factors indicated a transaction 
which possessed far more substance than a mere mortgage agree­
ment between Worthen and Lyon and a loan from Lyon to 
Worthen. 
The Court, however, acknowledged that favorable tax consid­
erations, measured by the benefits of the depreciation deductions 
on the facility, 41 influenced Lyon's decision to participate in the 
transaction. 42 Significant tax motivations and the acceptance of a 
lower economic return because of tax benefits did not nullify the 
form of the transaction where the transaction itself possessed sig­
nificant economic substance. 43 Lyon conceded a lower rate of re­
turn on its investment44 in order to obtain the anticipated benefit 
of depreciation deductions. To disallow the tax benefits simply be­
cause the otherwise legitimate business transaction rested on such 
tax advantages, would destroy the business purposes of the transac­
tion. 45 As long as Lyon possessed a sufficient depreciable interest 
39. The rents due at the end of the primary term of the lease after the mortgage 
has been paid fall short of the promised 6% return which, as the Service urges, Lyon 
is guaranteed. The assured return only exists if Worthen exercises its options to pur­
chase. Whether Worthen will exercise any of its options totally depends on the ex­
ternal contingencies of the value of real estate, the cost of money, and Worthen's 
capital structure at the time the options are exercisable. Thus, because of the contin­
gent nature of the options and the lack of any economic compulsion on the part of 
Worthen to exercise any of the options, the return of the investment with guaranteed 
interest cannot be considered in determining Lyon's depreciable interest. 435 U.S. at 
579-80. 
40. Id. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
41. 435 U.S. at 580. For an analysis of those favorable tax benefits akin to this 
type of sale-leaseback, see notes 71-73 infra. 
42. 435 U.S. at 580 (citing Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 503, 579-80 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
43. Kaster, Another View of the Implications of the Supreme Court Decision In 
Lyon, 49 J. TAX. 44 (1978). 
44. Lyon accrued no net profit from the rents since the rents equaled the 
amount due on the amortized loan from New York Life. To Lyon, the zero cash flow 
to him could be justified only by the tax benefits from the transaction. Without the tax 
benefits, Lyon's pu~ose for entering the transaction would be senseless, since his 
expected return would no longer exist. 
45. Generally, tax avoidance lacks relevance in determining the allowance of 
those contemplated tax benefits. See 435 U.S. at 575 (quoting Commissioner v. 
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960)). But, where the transaction incorporates tax 
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in the property, the Court found that the Service could not disal­
low the deductions. 
The nature of the Worthen-Lyon transaction indicated that 
there existed no simple owner of the building. Justice Blackmun 
nevertheless determined that Lyon committed its capital to the 
building. Therefore, Lyon was permitted to claim both deprecia­
tion deductions for the consumption of that capital and interest de­
ductions on the obligations stemming from the facility. Finally, 
after an analysis of the substance and economic realities of the 
transaction, as well as the status of all the parties,46 the Court held 
that since Lyon as the lessor retained "significant and genuine at­
tributes of the traditional lessor status," the Commissioner was 
compelled to honor the form adopted by the parties. 47 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens disputed the relevance of the 
factors relied on by the majority to establish Lyon's depreciable 
interest. Stevens contended that the existence of a true lessor­
lessee relationship depended on the present value of the lessor's 
reversionary estate to the lessor. 48 The lessor, through his remain­
ing interests upon the initiation of the lease, must participate in 
the risks and benefits of property ownership to render his interest 
in the property depreciable. 49 In the Worthen-Lyon transaction, 
benefits without the presence of a distinct business purpose beyond those benefits, 
the transaction assumes a sham characteristic. The tax benefits may be a motivating 
factor for one to become a party to a transaction, but those tax benefits cannot be the 
dominating reason for the transaction. Otherwise, the "business purpose doctrine" 
will require that the tax benefits be disallowed. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), afJ'd, 44 
T.C. 284 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). See also Young, The Role of 
Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAW. 275, 277-86 (1969). 
In Lyon, the Court failed to address the issue of a business purpose. The Court 
did recognize, however, that Lyon's principal motivation was diversification. See 435 
U.S. at 582. The presence of this fact thus eliminated the necessity for the Court to 
deal with the issue. 
46. Id. at 581-83. 
47. Justice Blackmun stated as his holding, 

[Wlhere, as here, there is a genuine multi-party· transaction with economic 

substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory re­

alities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped 

solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the 
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by 
the parties. 
Id. at 583-84. 
48. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This interest consisted of the power of 
the lessor to assume complete control over the facility upon expiration of the lessee's 
leasehold interest. 
49. Id. 
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the repurchase options, if exercised, guaranteed Lyon his equity 
investment with 6% return plus the balance of the New York Life 
mortgage. 50 Yet, the value of Lyon's reversionary interest might 
fluctuate in relation to the fair market value of the building. But, 
because of the return, Lyon's position upon exercise of the options 
would be no better or worse than at the outset of the transaction. 
On the other hand, Worthen's tender, upon repurchase, of the 
remaining rental payments plus Lyon's investment equity with ac­
crued return would, in reality, permit it to receive the entire 
interest in the facility without payment to Lyon for its reversionary 
interest. This power in Worthen attaches a zero value51 to Lyon's 
reversion over the primary term of the lease. The existence of the 
zero value interest, according to Justice Stevens, prohibited Lyon 
from participating in the risks and benefits of ownership and thus 
from being characterized as the owner of the facility. 52 
Justice Stevens' argument relies on the exercise of a power of 
the lessee, even though at the time of the agreement's formulation 
the exercise of that power remains uncertain. Worthen was under 
no economic compulsion to exercise any of the four repurchase op­
tions. 53 Similarly, although exercise was completely controlled by 
Worthen's discretion, the various contingencies54 surrounding 
the exercise of the repurchase options made such an event improb­
able at the outset of the lease term. Until such exercise became 
probable, a sufficient lessor-lessee relationship existed55 to give 
50. See note 12 supra. 
51. 435 U.S. at 585-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If Worthen should exercise its 
option to repurchase in the lIth year, Lyon would receive merely the remainder of 
the mortgage loan to Lyon from New York Life plus the initial $500,000 equity with 
6% return. See note 12 supra. At that point, Lyon would relinquish its rights over the 
remaining rental period and its reversionary interest for a figure equal only to the 
total rent due on the remaining rental period plus the investment with interest. Since 
no portion of the option price is attributed to the lessor's reversion, the interest is 
said to have zero-value. 
52. 435 U.S. at 586 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
If Worthen makes a commitment not to exercise the option, at that point, circum­
stances may change Significantly to recognize Lyon as the owner. Until such an 
event occurs, Justice Stevens would treat Worthen as the owner of the entire facility, 
since Worthen has an unrestricted cost-free power to exercise an option to purchase 
for the primary 25-year term. 
53. ld. at 587 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
54. See note 39 supra. 
55. Justice Stevens stated, 

[Lyon] assumed the risk that Worthen might not exercise its option to pur­

chase at or before the end of the original 25-year term. If Worthen should 
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Lyon a depreciable interest in the facility. 56 To bar depreciation 
deductions because of these options would impose an injustice on 
Lyon who otherwise would have had a depreciable interest in the 
facility. 
Justice White also filed a dissent57 and agreed with the anal­
ysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which had exam­
ined the issue of ownership through the acmal allocation of inter­
ests made by the parties. 58 Since Lyon would be guaranteed a re­
turn on his investment with interest throughout the maximum 
period of the transaction, Lyon incurred insignificant benefits, 
risks, and burdens to substantiate its claim as owner of the building 
for tax purposes. 59 This analysis differs from that of Justice Stevens 
who conceded that Lyon could become the owner upon Worthen's 
sacrifice, during the course of the lease, of its cost-free power to 
exercise its options. 6o In the view of Justice White and the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, Lyon could become 
the owner only after the facility reverted back to Lyon upon termi­
nation of the lease. 
Both dissenting Justices based their conclusions on the effects 
of the option terms and both assumed that Worthen at some time 
would exercise one of the options. 61 The opinions ignored the key 
fact that "simply too many contingencies, including variations in 
value of real estate, in the cost of money, and in the capital struc­
ture of Worthen,"62 existed to automatically assume that Worthen 
would not "walk away" from the relationship at the end of the pri­
exercise that right not to repay, perhaps it would then be appropriate to 
characterize petitioner as the owner and Worthen as the lessee. 
435 u.s. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By this statement, Stevens rests his conclu­
sion of no depreciable interest in Lyon on the nature of the repurchase options. 
Without these options, Lyon will possess the proper interest for tax purposes. 
56. See notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text. 
57. Justice White filed a dissent, but did not write an opinion. 
58. The Eighth Circuit analogized the interests held by the parties to a "bundle 
of sticks," in which each stick represented an interest in the underlying property. 
For sufficient ownership interest for tax purposes, the taxpayer must have possessed 
sufficient genuine interests in its bundle. The Eighth Circuit, however, after examin­
ing the various interests allocated by the documents, concluded that Worthen clearly 
possessed every meaningful interest, and that in reality, Lyon "toted an empty bun­
dle." See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1976). 
59. But see note 39 supra. 
60. 435 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also note 52 supra. 
61. Worthen was not economically compelled to renew or repurchase. See notes 
94-96 infra. 
62. 435 U.S. at 579. 
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mary rental period. The result, according to the majority, was that 
Lyon obligated its capital63 toward the building, and therefore 
could claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital. 
Because of the complicated nature and the unique circum­
stances of the transaction in Lyon, the effects of the Lyon decision 
on future sale-leaseback arrangements is speculative. Since Lyon is 
the first three-party sale-leaseback on which the Supreme Court 
has ruled, tax planner and tax collector alike will seek to use 
the decision to their advantage. Thus, framers of three-party sale­
leasebacks must consider Lyon within the scope of existing law and 
policies concerning these transactions. Failure to consider the im­
pact of Lyon could completely frustrate the overall business objec­
tives of the transaction, leaving the investor-lessor without the tax 
benefits required for a profitable transaction. 
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF THE 

WORTHEN-LYON TRANSACTION 

The Worthen-Lyon transaction was a specialized form of sale­
leaseback known as a finance lease. Under a finance lease, the les­
sor provides an initial investment from out-of-pocket funds and 
then finances the balance through a recourse mortgage loan. 64 The 
third party mortgagee's interest in the transaction centers on its 
recovery of the mortgage without interrupting the lease agreement 
between the lessor and lessee. Since the lessor assigns its interest 
in the lease to the mortgagee,65 the mortgagee is chiefly concerned 
with the financial stability of the lessee. 66 As long as the lease re­
63. Lyon's capital consisted of $500,000 out-of-pocket funds and borrowed 
funds from the New York Life mortgage. 
64. See Lefevre, The Tax Laws of Lease Transactions Revisited, 53 TAXES 764 
( 1975). 
The investor-lessor participates in the venture with a proportionally small out­
of-pocket investment in the purchase. The rental payments which are usually as­
signed to the mortgage guarantee enough income to the lessor for repayment of the 
mortgage with interest. Also, the mortgagee's risk is reduced, not only by the as­
signment of the lease, but by the recourse liability of the lessor if the lessee should 
walk from the transaction. 
65. In most financing leases, the rent covers the cost of the property, amortized 
over a period of time equal to the amounts due on the mortgage. The lessor, at the 
outset of the transaction, assigns its interest in the rents to the mortgagee, thus 
guaranteeing the mortgagee that the rents will flow directly to it to amortize the 
mortgage. 
66. New York Life in the transaction constitutes such a third party. In accepting 
the 25-year mortgage, New York Life expected its payment through the rents from 
the Worthen-Lyon lease, since Lyon had assigned all interests in the lease to it. 
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mains in effect, the lease assignment by the lessor will guarantee 
repayment of the mortgagee's full expected return. If the lessee 
should "walk" from the transaction, the lessor loses the guaranteed 
source of funds intended by the parties to satisfy the mortgage. 
The mortgagee, if the lessor cannot secure another lessee and lacks 
the sufficient funds to satisfy the mortgage, may realize less than 
the full expected return. 67 Because of the recourse nature of the 
transaction, however, the full burden of repayment ultimately falls 
on the investor-lessor. No matter how the transaction concludes, 
the lessor must satisfy the mortgage or be subject to foreclosure. 68 
Unlike the more simple two-party sale-leaseback, which de­
veloped solely as a tax sheltering device,69 the finance lea~e 
evolved as a financing technique to raise the capital necessary 
for long-range equipment and facility purchases. 7o Yet, from the 
investor-lessor's point of view, the primary appeal of the finance 
lease is the various tax advantages it offers. 71 These tax considera­
67. What the mortgagee recovers depends on the terms of the mortgage agree­
ment. Because the mortgage is recourse, the lessor will be personally liable on the 
mortgage. The lessor, however, may feel that default would be more practical than 
being "stuck" with the building throughout the mortgage period. Besides being 
without a tenant and a source of revenue, the lessor will incur the expenses as­
sociated with ownership of such a building including maintenance, insurance, and 
taxes, as well as the debt service on the mortgage. The lessor thus will default, re­
sulting in an acceleration of the mortgage with penalties. The terms will guarantee 
the mortgagee immediate recovery of the principal, but the penalty will not equal 
the return rate if the transaction had continued for the full period. The mortgagee 
will have the facility sold at a foreclosure sale with the lessor liable through a defi­
ciency judgment for any amount remaining on the mortgage not realized from the 
sale. 
68. The Supreme Court considered Lyon's assumption of the risk in the in­
vestment as a key factor in deciding in Lyon's favor. See 435 V.S. at 567-77. See also 
notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text. 
69. See generally Cary, supra note 3; Zeitlan, supra note 1. 
70. Lefevre, supra note 64, at 764-65. A new financing industry has evolved in 
leasing for major industries in need of new sources of capital over the last several 
years; a phenomenon Lefevre attributes to sluggish new-issue securities markets and 
increased interest rates. Citing the transportation and utility industries as examples, 
Lefevre states that "scarcely a major capital project is undertaken without considera­
tion of lease financing." [d. at 764. 
71. See Young, supra note 3, at 290-94. See also Comment, Sale and Lease.back 
Transactions, 52 N.Y.V.L. REV. 672 (1977). The tax advantages of the transaction 
allow the buyer-lessor depreciation deductions under I.R.C. § 167, and in some situa­
tions investment credit under I.R.C. § 38, which can be transferred to the lessee 
under I.R.C. § 48. The seller-lessee receives rent deductions under I.R.C. § 162. 
Business advantages for the buyer-lessor consist of a safe investment of its capital. 
The seller-lessee has the advantages of raising capital for the full market value of the 
property, still has use of the facility, and prevents any liability from being entered on 
its books so as not to hinder future borrowing. 
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tions, in the form of investment credit, accelerated depreciation, 
and interest deductions, determine the investor's financing profit, 72 
and create a leasing rate lower than the cost of borrowed funds. 73 
The disallowance of the tax benefits increases the cost of leasing to 
the lessee and reduces the lessor's return on its investment. This 
destroys the original business objectives of the transaction. 74 Thus, 
while the transaction is primarily a financing technique for the les­
see, its structure requires significant tax benefits for the investor­
lessor. Guidelines for the tax treatment of these arrangements are 
needed to uphold the business purpose of the transaction desired 
by the parties, while maintaining a form acceptable to the Service. 
72. The investor seeks to recover from the transaction an amount greater than 
the interest paid on the mortgage. This amount may be generated from the rents. 
Where the lessor agrees to a zero cash flow-rental payments equal to the amortized 
amount of the loan resulting in zero profits from that source of cash remaining with 
the lessor-the tax beI!efits remain the only reliable source of gain to the investor­
lessor. 
73. These tax consequences effectively grant the lessor, as the investor, suffi­
cient tax benefits that produce a lease rate lower than the costs of borrowed funds. In 
the Worthen-Lyon transaction, the borrowed funds of $7,140,000 amortized at 6%% 
over 25 years would equal $14,989,767.24, resulting in a financing cost to Lyon of 
$7,849,767.24. The rents equaled the exact amount necessary to fully amortize the 
New York Life note. Since Lyon's profit on the investment was not figured into the 
rent, he possessed a zero cash flow. Yet, under I.R.C. § 61, the rental payments 
would be included in Lyon's gross income each year. 
The various tax benefits, however, offset the rental payments included in Lyon's 
gross income. Under I.R.C. § 163(a), the interest cost would be deducted, leaving 
$7,140,000 of rents which represented the principal of the loan to be offset by further 
deductions. The investment credit allowed under I.R.C. § 38 would offset some of 
that balance. In this case, however, the credit was retained by Worthen under I.R.C. 
§ 48(d), leaving only the depreciation deductions to offset the balance of the rents. 
Under Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1937), the portion of the property 
financed by borrowed funds is depreciable even though the owner has a small per­
centage of out-of-pocket funds invested in the project. Thus, as in Lyon, where the 
facility's lifetime equals that of the loan period, the entire cost of the facility can be 
deducted as depreciation during the repayment of the loan. 
Under I.R.C. § 167, the depreciation may be accelerated, resulting in a deprecia­
tion of the facility in Lyon during the first 11 years of the 25-year life of the facility. 
Assuming that Lyon has sufficient income to be offset by the deductions beyond the 
rentals received from Worthen, the after-tax benefit could total 1.5 million dollars. 
See 435 U.S. at 572 n.lO. If Worthen exercises the lith-year repurchase option, Lyon 
would receive the remaining balance plus his investment with interest, subject to 
capital gains taxes on the sale. Also, even if Worthen leases for the full term of the 
lease, Lyon will have benefited from the deferment of the tax liability which is in 
essence a loan from the government. See also Gallagher, supra note 23; Lefevre, 
supra note 64, at 772-73; Schmidt & Larsen, Leveraged Lease Arrangements: Tax 
Factors that Contribute to their Attractiveness, 41 J. TAX. 210 (1974). 
74. This is especially true in the Worthen-Lyon situation where Lyon opted for 
a zero cash flow in expectation of the various tax benefits associated with the transac­
tion. 
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V. THE SEARCH FOR GUIDELINES 
The Supreme Court's multi-faceted analysis failed to provide 
sufficient guidelines necessary for competent tax and business 
planning. 75 Instead, the Court offered a general holding that 
whether "a genuine multiparty transaction with economic sub­
stance" exists in a particular situation will depend on the facts of 
the case. 76 The development of leasing as a financing technique 
requires guidelines sufficient to guarantee that the lessor possesses 
a depreciable interest in the property at the time the parties for­
mulate the transaction. Otherwise, the transaction fails to accom­
plish its ultimate goal of reduced financing costs to the lessee and 
maximum investment return to the lessor. Since the opinion offers 
little in terms of adequate guidelines, the pre-Lyon law and the 
effects of the decision on it must be evaluated. 
The present Internal Revenue Service guidelines do not pro­
vide a concrete basis upon which to formulate future real estate 
financing leases. In its first major ruling on leasing, Revenue Rul­
ing 55-540,77 the Service listed a number of factors which it con­
sidered evidence of a sale rather than a lease. These factors, how­
ever, dealt with equipment leases and except in the most clear-cut 
situations were too general to be of use to tax planners. 78 
The period after these early rulings marked the debut of a 
variation of the finance lease known as the leveraged lease. 79 The 
leveraged lease is modeled after the finance lease except that the 
75. See Zarrow & Gorden, supra note 16. The authors have concluded that the 
case offers little guidance to the practitioner. 
76. 435 U.S. at 583-84. 
77. 1955-2 C.B. 39. For a list of factors, see 435 U.S. at 577 n.14. See also 
Javaras & Nelson, The New Leveraged Lease Guidelines, 53 TAXES 388, 393-94 
(1975). 
78. Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77, at 393; Lefevre, supra note 64, at 765 n.2. 
These authors cite other revenue rulings reinforcing the Service's position including 
the following: Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 72-408, 1972-2 C.B. 86; 
Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 57-371, 1957-1 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 55­
542, 1955-2 C.B. 58; and Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19. 
79. See Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77; Lefevre, supra note 64. 
The leveraged lease typically involves the following: (1) A lessor who creates 
leverage by committing his personal funds to the purchase price (usually 20%), bor­
rows the remainder on a non-recourse basis, and then leases the property to another 
party on a net lease basis for substantially the property's useful life; (2) a lender who 
finances most of the purchase price on a non-recourse basis relying solely on the 
leased property and the lease as security; and (3) a lessee who obligates itself to 
rental payments sufficient to allow the lessor to recover its investment and to service 
the debt, usually with a profit. See Mann & Schmidt, The New Leveraged Lease 
Guidelines, 6 TAX ADVISOR 390 (1975). 
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lessor retains part of the cost of the property by a non-recourse 
loan secured solely by a mortgage on the property and a security 
assignment of the lease. 8o In response to this development, the 
Service issued Revenue Procedure 75-21,81 which announced spe­
cific guidelines82 for the circumstances under whi(!h it would issue 
a ruling on a leveraged lease. In Lyon, however, the Court prop­
erly observed in a footnote83 that the Service's guidelines were not 
definitive and that they offered little guidance in formulating real 
estate lease transactions. 
Since the criteria employed by the Service to evaluate real 
estate leases remains speculative, the ultimate source of guidelines 
continues to be the various lease characterization cases resolved 
over the last three decades. 84 The courts, in ascertaining the eco­
nomic substance of these transactions, have traditionally dealt first 
with an examination of the business bargain formulated by the par­
ties. The earlier lower court decisions focused on the legal effect of 
the transaction intended by the parties; their allocation of interests, 
as read in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances existing 
at the time of the transaction. 85 
The United States Supreme Court in Lyon concluded that the 
80. Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77; Lefevre, supra note 64, at 773-76. 
81. 1975-1 C.B. 715. This ruling has no effect on Lyon, since it was issued after 
the transaction. 
82. The guidelines in general include the following: (a) The lessor incurs and 
maintains a minimal investment equaling 20% of the cost of the property; (b) the 
lessee can purchase only at fair market value; (c) the lessee furnishes no part of the 
cost of the property; (d) the lessee has not lent to the lessor or guaranteed any part of 
his indebtedness; and (e) the lessor must expect a profit on the transaction other than 
from the tax treatment benefits. See also 435 U.S. at 577 n.14. 
83. ld. See also Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 147 n.1. The distinc­
tion between real property and equipment leasing is that equipment will almost in­
evitably diminish in value through wear and tear, resulting in little or no residual 
value at the end of the lease. Realty, however, because of customary maintenance 
and improvements, frequently maintains its value and often may increase in value 
over the period of the lease. 
After considering to some extent the complaints of the real estate industry, the 
Service agreed not to consider the general application of Rev. Proc. 75-21 to real 
property. See id. (citing a letter from John W. Holt, Director, Corporate Tax Division, 
to the National Retail Merchants Association, May 28, 1975). 
84. See Lefevre, supra note 64, at 772-73. 
85. See generally Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); 
Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955); Benton v. Commissioner, 
197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952). These early cases concentrated on the lease versus sale 
issue and, in most cases, involved only two parties. The intent issue, however, has 
been carried over into the three-party cases. See Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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parties intended an allocation of interests associated with a sale­
leaseback. 86 The Court, however, failed to analyze the legal signifi­
cance of the intent of the parties in arriving at the interest allo­
cations_ In cases where unambiguous and complete documents 
clearly define the allocation of interests, the lower courts have fo­
cused their analysis on the substance of the transaction in light of 
its background at the time of the execution of the agreement. 87 In 
this traditional approach, the parties' good-faith belief as to the 
legal effects of the documents is irrelevant in ascertaining economic 
substance. Where, however, the basic rights, duties, and economic 
interests of the parties are disputed, and the documents are in­
complete and ambiguous, the courts view the parties' subjective 
intent as an indication of the true allocation of interests among the 
parties. 88 The result of traditional judicial analysis is that the objec­
tive interest allocation as expressed by the written documents es­
tablishes the legal effect of the transaction, while the subjective 
intent of the parties merely establishes the gist of otherwise vague 
or incomplete agreements. 
In Lyon the parties' subjective intent was irrelevant because 
the documents clearly spelled out the terms of the transaction. 89 
Tax planners, to assure that the desired interest allocation is pre­
served, must draft documents which indisputably characterize the 
allocation of interests intended by the parties. Otherwise, if the 
allocation is vague, a court will employ the unexpressed subjective 
intent of the parties as ascertained by the existing facts and circum­
stances to reveal the substance of the transaction. Reliance on 
86. 435 U.S. at 579. 
87. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977). See also M & W 
Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Western Contracting Co. v. 
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 
(9th Cir. 1956); Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 
1956); Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Universal Drilling Co. 
v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. La. 1976); Arkansas Bank and Trust Co. v. 
United States, 224 F. Supp. 171 (W.O. Ark. 1963); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 
209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
88. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1977). The result 
is that the subjective intent of the parties becomes a consideration for the court only 
in the interpretation of the agreement. Once the rights, duties, and economic inter­
ests are determined, subjective intent becomes totally immaterial in the characteriza­
tion of the transaction for tax purposes. 
89. The Eighth Circuit dealt with the issue at length. It concluded that the 
documents represented the true allocation of interests between the parties, so as to 
render any inquiry into the parties' subjective intent irrelevant. See Frank Lyon Co. 
v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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the intent factor, which itself is a question of fact,90 is a risky 
and unpredictable approach which the prudent tax planner should 
avoid. 
Rather than looking to subjective intent, the Lyon Court con­
centrated on the primary task of determining the economic sub­
stance of the transaction from the parties' objective intent as ex­
pressed in written documents. 91 In this area, lower courts have 
emphasized the acquisition of an "equity" in the property by the 
lessee as a fundamental factor in determining the economic sub­
stance of a sale-leaseback. 92 If the lessee acquires an equity during 
the course of rental payments, it is deemed the owner of the prop­
erty for tax purposes. 93 The parties' "objective intent" to acquire 
ownership of the property determines the existence of the equity. 
If the lessee acquires an option to purchase at substantially below 
fair market value at the date of exercise,94 if he is economically 
compelled to renew the lease or to purchase,95 or if he receives a 
90. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977). 
91. The economic factors which surround the transaction permit the allocation 
of interests between the parties, allowing the substance of the transaction to be pin­
pointed. The importance of this stage of analysis rests in the fact that if the cumula­
tive effect of these factors deprives the lessor of significant ownership, the lessee will 
be treated as the owner of the facility for tax purposes. 
92. See Lefevre, supra note 64; Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 150. 
Equity is defined as the lessee acquiring ownership of his leasehold through the 
application of rental payments toward a future purchase price. 
93. See generally M & W Gear Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 
1971); Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); 
Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1955); Benton v. Commissioner, 
197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Universal Drilling Co. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 
1231 (E.D. La. 1976); Arkansas Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 
171 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 
1962). 
94. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1955) (real estate lease 
with option to reacquire title at the end of a 68-year term for $10 not a lease for tax 
purposes); LVT Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974) (option to purchase based 
on expected fair market value of the property at exercise date ruled as a valid lease); 
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), affd, 500 F.2d 
1222 (9th Cir. 1974) (substantial options to purchase on equipment lease held valid). 
It should be noted that not every lease that contains an option to purchase is 
automatically disregarded for tax purposes. One who takes an option may do so with 
the hope of exercising it, but not necessarily with the intent of creating an equity 
interest during the lease term. See Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Com"1issioner, 232 
F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956). The decision ultimately depends on the objective intent of 
the parties, indicated by the economic factors of the case in the light of the facts and 
circumstances existing at the time of the formation of the agreement. See Benton v. 
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Commissioner, 209 F. 
Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
95. Usually, the situation arises where the rents are high during the primary 
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bargain renewal option,96 the lessee acquires for tax purposes an 
equity interest in the property through his rental payments. 
In Lyon, no such equity existed since there was no legal obli­
gation between the parties representing an agreed return on the 
investment. 97 In the finance lease situation,98 equity exists if the 
rents indicate a fixed return on the owner's investment or if the 
options when exercised are intended to provide that fixed return, 
regardless of the appreciation or depreciation of the property.99 
Lyon would realize such a return if Worthen exercised one of the 
repurchase or renewal options,lOO but the Court concluded that 
this exercise could not be guaranteed with reasonable certainty. 
Worthen could walk away from the transaction after the primary 
lease expired, since it was not legally or economically compelled to 
stay. 101 
The lack of a guaranteed investment return for Lyon imposed 
sufficient risks and benefits of ownership on Lyon. It is this owner­
ship interest which determined that the transaction possessed suffi­
cient economic substance for taxation purposes. The result, as the 
Court concluded, was a sufficient depreciable interest attributed to 
Lyon. Therefore, for a finance lease to be economically substantial, 
the repurchase and renewal options must allow the lessor to par­
ticipate in the risks and benefits normally associated with a depre­
ciable interest. 
tenn, or where the lessee has made improvements in the property, and the purchase 
or renewal options are so low that the lessee becomes economically compelled to 
exercise. Lefevre, supra note 64, at 767-70. 
96. Compare Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) and 
Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964), 
affd, 342 F.2d.994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965) with Lockhart Leasing 
Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 301 (1970), affd, 446 F.2d 269 (10th CiT. 1971). 
97. The government had contended that the $500,000 investment by Lyon con­
stituted a loan at a guaranteed return of 6%. As later indicated by the Court, the rents 
alone failed to provide this return, since the only way the return could be realized 
was by the renewal or repurchase options being exercised by Worthen. See 435 U.S. 
at 579. 
98. In the earlier, simpler, two-party sale-leasebacks, the equity issue served to 
expose the transaction as a sale. If the lessee as a result of the rental payments 
acquires something of value in relation to the overall transaction beyond the mere 
use of property, then he acquires equity. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying 
text. 
99. See Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977) (rents and 
option privileges found to provide an equity by guaranteeing the investor a return on 
funds invested). 
100. See notes 10 & 12 supra and accompanying text. 
101. 435 U.S. at 583. 
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VI. THE EFFECTS OF LYON 
The Supreme Court in Lyon offered tax planners insufficient 
guidelines to aid them in the planning of future finance leases. In­
stead of attempting to synthesize the vast array of case law and 
commentary, the opinion fuels the already raging dispute between 
taxpayer and tax collector. The Court upheld the finance lease as 
having the substance of a true sale-leaseback. It failed, however, to 
provide taxpayers with the essential guidelines for the formulation 
of individual finance leases. 
The opinion does communicate pitfalls which must be avoided 
in future transactions. The Court believes that ownership for tax 
purposes requires a risk of loss and a possibility of a profit from an 
investment in property.102 These ownership risks are not based on 
calculated lease rates, since leases with zero cash returnl03 are con­
sidered valid and acceptable for tax purposes.104 The tax planner 
may continue to employ the tax benefits to calculate investment 
incentive and to compute the prOjected rate of return. 105 If, how­
ever, the investment recovery is reasonably assured through the 
reduction of risk by a guaranteed residual or fixed options, then the 
transaction possesses insufficient economic substance for tax pur­
poses. The transaction offers to the lessor no depreciable interest in 
the property, resulting in a recharacterization of the transaction as 
a loan. lOS But, if the transaction passes muster by actually placing 
real and appropriate risks and benefits of ownership on the lessor, 
then the government is bound to follow the form adopted by the 
parties. 
The Lyon decision may have a significant impact on leveraged 
lease transactions. 107 In an earlier case before the Tax Court, 
102. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See Lefevre, supra note 64, at 774. The lelise rates are calculated to be 
somewhat less than the interest rates on borrowed funds. The investors hope to prof­
it from the residual and the tax benefits even to the point of accepting a lease which 
produces only enough rent to service the debt, i.e., zero cash return. 
104. Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11. The absence of a cash flow should 
not be significant, since it merely serves a function of the extent to which the owner 
has borrowed to purchase the property. The critical ownership attribute is the rent 
for the use of the property. If the lessee pays a fair rental value, then the fact that all 
the rental is used by the lessor to service a debt should not effect ownership. 
105. See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text. 
107. Even though the Worthen-Lyon transaction was not a leveraged lease 
transaction, the two are nevertheless akin to each other. The leveraged lease, how­
ever, attempts to remove personal liability from the lessor for the financing if the 
transaction should fall through during the lease period. See notes 64-68 supra and 
accompanying text. 
621 1979] SALE-LEASEBACKS 
David F. Bolger, 108 the court created a unique tax shelter by treat­
ing a lessor of property acquired with no cash investment but with 
large non-recourse financing as the owner of the property. This 
enabled the taxpayer to offset excess earnings beyond rental pay­
ments through large accelerated depreciation deductions with very 
little personal investment. 109 Under this ruling, the taxpayer 
achieves tax postponement through the depreciation deductions 
and can still walk away from the building and the loans if the trans­
action should collapse. The Tax Court, despite the lack of risk in the 
investment, concluded that for tax purposes the amount of the in­
vestment financed by the non-recourse mortgage constituted a de­
preciable interest. 
The Supreme Court in Lyon emphasized that Lyon's personal 
liability on the mortgage notes was an important factor surrounding 
the Worthen-Lyon transaction,uo The Court did not directly con­
demn transactions in which the lessor's liability was substantially 
non-recourse. But, by emphasizing Lyon's personal liability on the 
mortgage note, the Court implied that in chameleon-like transac­
tions where the investment is a non-recourse liability, that invest­
ment, when considered in the light of other factorslll surrounding 
the individual transaction, will indicate a debtor-creditor relation­
ship between the parties. Since non-recourse financing shifts the 
transaction toward a debtor-creditor relationship, other factors must 
exist in the transaction to balance the lack of personal risk in the 
financing. The crucial factor for the tax planner to consider would 
be the avoidance of renewal and repurchase options which include 
a guaranteed return. Even though the options would meet the 
mandates of Lyon through uncertainty in the lessee's exercise and 
the lack of economic compulsion on the lessee to exercise the 
options, such a factor might be outweighed by the total lack of 
personal risk in the financing by the investor-Iessor. 112 Since the 
combination of these factors would undoubtedly produce a debtor­
creditor relationship, the parties must choose between non­
recourse financing and options which guarantee a return though 
uncertain in their exercise. If the parties choose non-recourse 
108. 59 T.C. 760 (1973). 
109. The Bolger procedure is explained in Comment, Tax Court Approves Two 
Real Estate Tax Shelter Deals; Cases may be Appealed, 38 J. TAX. 263 (1973). For an 
analysis of the effects of Bolger, see Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That 
Wore No Clothes, 28 TAX L. REV. 355 (1973). 
110. 435 U.S. at 577. 
111. For a list offactors, see id. at 582-83. 
112. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text. 
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financing and base the options on fair market value without consid­
eration of a guaranteed return in any form, any argument by the 
Service based on Lyon that attacks the non-recourse financing 
would be weakened by the lack of a guaranteed return. If both 
non-recourse financing and guaranteed return are chosen, the Ser­
vice can then forcefully argue that the non-recourse liability of the 
lessor distinguishes that case from Lyon and therefore the trans­
action possesses insufficient substance to constitute a depreciable 
interest. 
Planning sale-Ieasebacks seeks to assure that the transaction 
results at its inception in an economically genuine lessor-lessee re­
lationship that will permit the tax benefits to flow to the lessor­
investor. Sufficient risks and benefits of ownership must remain 
with the lessor during the entire course of the lease period. 
Otherwise, the tax benefits will not accrue to the lessor, resulting 
in the disruption of the business purposes for which he entered 
into the transaction. 113 
Many of the motivating factors surrounding the Lyon transac­
tion may not exist in other finance leases. Among these are the 
legal restraints preventing Worthen from building its own facility, 
Worthen's possession of options by order of the banking regulators, 
and the requirement by the federal banking regulators of owner­
ship of the building by an independent third party.114 Yet, circum­
stances in Lyon do exist which render the decision a useful tax 
planning tool, despite the lack of specific guidelines within the deci­
sion. The personal liability of the lessor,115 the lessee's repurchase 
and renewal options which neither gave the lessee an increasing 
equity116 nor guaranteed the lessor a recoupment of its invest­
ment,117 and the independence of the investor-lessor from the les­
see, all indicated a transaction with substantial economic substance. 
Such factors exist in most of today's finance leases. Failure to exam­
ine them in light of Lyon will result in the classification of the 
transaction as a financing technique with little or no attributes of a 
lease, and ultimately in the disallowance of the anticipated deduc­
tions to the lessor. 
Jerome]. Kavulich 
113. See notes 64-74 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See 435 U.S. at 582. 
115. See id. at 577. 
116. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text. 
117. See notes 92-lOl supra and accompanying text. 
